
{"id":1350,"date":"2016-11-02T23:26:04","date_gmt":"2016-11-02T23:26:04","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/?p=1350"},"modified":"2016-11-02T23:27:13","modified_gmt":"2016-11-02T23:27:13","slug":"nato-may-not-be-ready-to-fight-russia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/2016\/11\/02\/nato-may-not-be-ready-to-fight-russia\/","title":{"rendered":"NATO MAY NOT BE READY TO FIGHT RUSSIA"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2016\/08\/Russian-military-drill.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-1081\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2016\/08\/Russian-military-drill.jpg\" alt=\"Russian military drill\" width=\"800\" height=\"600\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2016\/08\/Russian-military-drill.jpg 800w, https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2016\/08\/Russian-military-drill-300x225.jpg 300w, https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2016\/08\/Russian-military-drill-560x420.jpg 560w, https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2016\/08\/Russian-military-drill-260x195.jpg 260w, https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2016\/08\/Russian-military-drill-160x120.jpg 160w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Sourced : The National Interst<\/p>\n<p>By Ian Brzezinski and Nicholas Varangis<\/p>\n<p>Military exercises are a critical means of testing, refining and demonstrating readiness for combat operations. In February 2015, we published a chart comparing the magnitudes of military exercises conducted by NATO and Russia.<\/p>\n<p>The contrast was jarring, with Russian exercises dwarfing those of NATO. The updated chart captures much of that data and indicates that since then, the NATO-Russia Exercise Gap, though reduced, remains strategically significant.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Then<\/p>\n<p>In 2013 and 2014, Russia frequently executed large scale exercises. These included at least six drills involving between 65,000 and 155,000 personnel\u2014four of them over 100,000 personnel each. In contrast, the largest exercise conducted by NATO or allied forces during that timeframe brought 16,000 to the field.<\/p>\n<p>Russia\u2019s military conducted numerous no-notice \u201csnap\u201d exercises, sometimes involving 50,000 personnel. Some \u201csnap\u201d drills were personally ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin. They test a military\u2019s ability to mobilize and deploy with immediacy. They are an important means by which Moscow attempts to intimidate it neighbors.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>And Now<\/p>\n<p>In response to Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine and other provocations, NATO promulgated its Readiness Action Plan (RAP) during the alliance\u2019s September 2014 summit meeting in Wales, United Kingdom. A key element of the RAP is a more robust exercise regime to reinforce NATO\u2019s deterrence-end defense posture.<\/p>\n<p>The updated chart captures exercises involving 5,000 or more personnel. It indicates that over the last two years, the exercise gap has narrowed, but it still remains a poor reflection of NATO\u2019s readiness and determination in contrast to that of its eastern adversary.<\/p>\n<p>Over that period, Russia conducted only two massive exercises. CENTR-15 in September 2015 involved 95,000 personnel. Russia\u2019s chief of the general staff boasted that last September\u2019s KAVKAZ-16 involved some 120,000 personnel\u2014though some analysts assert this total camouflages an amalgamation of separate exercises.<\/p>\n<p>NATO stepped up its game, conducting larger exercises, but none came close to matching Russia\u2019s largest drills. The alliance\u2019s October 2015 TRIDENT JUNCTURE was conducted in Spain and Portugal\u2014far from NATO\u2019s eastern front\u2014and featured 38,000 personnel. Last June\u2019s ANAKONDA exercise, hosted by Poland\u2014not NATO\u2014tested 31,000 military personnel. The next largest exercise conducted by NATO allies was Norway\u2019s COLD RESPONSE with 15,000 personnel.<\/p>\n<p>Among others, Russia conducted four exercises involving between 25,000 and 38,000 personnel.<\/p>\n<p>The exercise gap was reduced in part by the increased size and frequency of NATO exercises but the main driver was the reduced frequency of Russia\u2019s massive exercises. The reasons for the latter could include the competing personnel, equipment, logistical and financial demands generated by Moscow\u2019s military operations in Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere. Indeed, a senior Russian official told the Financial Times last year that \u201cthe cost of the Syria operation was expected to be covered by reducing the number and scale of domestic military exercises.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>NATO\u2019S Enhanced Forward Presence<\/p>\n<p>The NATO-Russia exercise gap, though reduced, still undercuts the alliance\u2019s deterrent posture. Exercises reflect resolve and readiness, and today Russia continues to conduct consistently larger exercises than NATO. Moscow\u2019s snap drills continue unabated while the alliance\u2019s political leadership still balks at giving its commanders the authority to conduct their own snap drills.<\/p>\n<p>The largest exercise planned by NATO Allies in 2017 will be the U.S.-led SABER GUARDIAN slated for the spring of 2017 in Romania and Bulgaria. It will combine with other exercises planned in the Black Sea region, including with Ukraine and Georgia, to have a total weight approaching 30,000 personnel.<\/p>\n<p>Addressing the NATO-Russia exercise gap will become more urgent now that the alliance decided to deploy a combat battalion in each of the Baltic states and Poland to deter and defend against potential Russian aggression.<\/p>\n<p>These small, forward-deployed units will be the core of NATO\u2019s Enhanced Forward Presence. They will be positioned against the exponentially larger, heavily armed units of Russia\u2019s Western District, and Moscow has announced plans to add or upgrade three divisions of that region. EFP\u2019s deterrent value will be a function of the combat capability of its battalions and the alliance\u2019s ability to rapidly reinforce the Baltic region in crisis and conflict. And the latter will only be credible if it is tested and demonstrated regularly through robust exercises proximate to the line of confrontation.<\/p>\n<p>NATO\u2019s Enhanced Forward Presence and its four battalions of some 4,000 personnel intend be fully operational in the spring 2017. Russia recently announced plans to conduct the next iteration of its ZAPAD (WEST) exercises in 2017. As our chart indicates, ZAPAD 2013 brought over 90,000 Russian troops to the field. Next year\u2019s iteration of ZAPAD can be expected to take place in the summer, be just as large, and have NATO\u2019s EFP in its crosshairs.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Sourced : The National Interst By Ian Brzezinski and Nicholas Varangis Military exercises are a critical means of testing, refining and demonstrating readiness for combat operations. In February 2015, we published a chart comparing the magnitudes of military exercises conducted by NATO and Russia. The contrast was jarring, with Russian exercises dwarfing those of NATO.&hellip; <a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/2016\/11\/02\/nato-may-not-be-ready-to-fight-russia\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">NATO MAY NOT BE READY TO FIGHT RUSSIA<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1081,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[1098,1097,1096,66,27,788],"class_list":["post-1350","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-conflict","tag-anakonda-exercise","tag-centr-15","tag-kavkaz-16","tag-nato","tag-russia","tag-vladimir-putin","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1350","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1350"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1350\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1352,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1350\/revisions\/1352"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1081"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1350"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1350"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1350"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}