{"id":2363,"date":"2017-07-06T20:10:21","date_gmt":"2017-07-06T20:10:21","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/?p=2363"},"modified":"2017-07-06T20:13:32","modified_gmt":"2017-07-06T20:13:32","slug":"fleet-battle-staffs-and-dartmouth-centre-for-seapower-and-strategy-resurgent-russia-conference-note","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/2017\/07\/06\/fleet-battle-staffs-and-dartmouth-centre-for-seapower-and-strategy-resurgent-russia-conference-note\/","title":{"rendered":"FLEET BATTLE STAFFS AND DARTMOUTH CENTRE FOR SEAPOWER AND STRATEGY \u2018RESURGENT RUSSIA\u2019 CONFERENCE NOTE"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

On Tue 13 Jun 17 the Fleet Battle Staffs (FBS) and the Dartmouth Centre for Seapower and Strategy (DCSS) delivered a conference entitled \u2018Resurgent Russia\u2019 at HMS EXCELLENT.\u00a0 Attended by up to 120 people across academia and the military, the conference\u2019s ambition was to highlight Russia\u2019s resurgent role as a \u2018global power\u2019 with emphasis on the maritime impacts for the Royal Navy.\u00a0 Funded by DCSS and hosted by the Royal Navy, the conference achieved its aim of prompting debate and critical thought in the ensuing workshops.<\/p>\n

The conference was purposely held at an \u2018Official\u2019 level and under \u2018Chatham House\u2019 rules; this allowed discussion without attribution.\u00a0 It was fully acknowledged that the conference complements wider work strands and in spreading rather than initiating discussions on a resurgent Russia.\u00a0 This note provides a summary of the key issues raised.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Conference Details<\/strong><\/p>\n

Conference Objectives<\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Understand Russia\u2019s strategy; with a focus on the implications for the Naval Service.<\/li>\n
  2. Provide a networking opportunity for Service personnel, Academics and Contractors.<\/li>\n
  3. Develop critical and analytical thinking within the Fleet Battle Staffs .<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

     <\/p>\n

    Presentations<\/strong>. The conference started with 30 minute presentations to set the context. The presentations were as follows:<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. Dr Graeme Herd : Russian Strategic Culture \u2013 what can we learn from Russian activities in the Baltics.<\/li>\n
    2. Dr Andreas Liaropoulos : Russian Information Warfare.<\/li>\n
    3. Dr David Reindorp : Planning issues concerning the Maritime Grey Space.<\/li>\n
    4. Dr Rod Thornton : Russia activity in the Syrian conflict.<\/li>\n
    5. Dr James Bergeron : Russia Maritime Strategy.<\/li>\n
    6. Panel Discussion: Dr Graeme Herd, Dr Thornton and Dr Liaropoulos.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

       <\/p>\n

      Conference Key Themes<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Putin\u2019s leadership<\/strong>. Several of the presentations portrayed Putin as a leader who creates and then exploits crises abroad in order to strengthen\/maintain his position domestically. Dr Herd argued that Putin\u2019s CoG was the belief that Russian people needed a strong leader to protect Russia from aggressive foreign powers.\u00a0 There was broad consensus amongst the presenters that Putin\u2019s biggest fear is a coup instigated by Russian elites or a coloured\/Arab spring style revolution and that his ultimate succession is far from clear.<\/p>\n

      Operating within the \u2018Grey Space\u2019<\/strong>. Russia has mastered the ability to blur the space between peace and war with belligerent activities that aim to form an \u2018alternative truth\u2019. These co-ordinated activities suit Russia\u2019s short decision cycle and whilst heightening tension, invariably fall short of the threshold to warrant a collective NATO response.\u00a0 Plausible deniability is at the heart of information operations that support a disruptive narrative and include cyber operations, fake news, PsyOps, proxy forces, criminal activity and mercenaries.\u00a0 Meanwhile, intelligence services challenge the legitimacy and authority of adversaries, compromising key leaders, obfuscating the clear evidence required to garner decision authority amongst Western democracies and can be rapidly de-escalated to dilute resolve. It is particularly challenging, due to policy and legal constraints, for liberal democracies to counter Russian false narratives\/falsehoods.\u00a0 Dr Reindorp highlighted the difficulties that conventional militaries have in planning operations within this \u2018grey space\u2019\u00a0 emphasising the need to caveat traditional reductionist planning tools whilst considering alternatives which can match this increasingly complex norm.\u00a0 He purports to increasing the focus on education and inculcating a mind-set that that instinctively considers a spectrum of activities, including non-kinetic capabilities to counter Russian behaviour.<\/p>\n

      Increased importance of the Maritime<\/strong>.\u00a0 Dr Bergeron\u2019s presentation emphasised the marked recent increase Russian maritime tempo and investment in new equipment which together have generated considerable interest within NATO.\u00a0 Western strategic outlook has been dominated this century with countering jihadist irregulars acting in the vacuum created in poverty stricken nations without strong governance or rule of law. Whilst the jihadist\u2019s agenda still spreads its shadow far from its source in the Middle East, the global outlook now has the additional pressure with a return to \u2018great power\u2019 geopolitics.\u00a0 Revisionist powers are now openly challenging the Western dominated international rules based system that they contend promoted US and European hegemony at their expense.\u00a0 This rivalry is most likely to be expressed at sea.<\/p>\n

      Russian Maritime Strategy<\/strong>. Dr Bergeron strongly argued that the Russians are implementing their published 2015 Maritime Strategy although this has been tempered by the effect on the economy of depressed oil prices and an underdeveloped defence industrial base. He argued that Russia has effectively deployed a 2 tier Navy with prestigious larger ships, reminiscent of the Soviet Navy alongside a lighter less expensive but highly effective coastal navy equipped with modern systems such as the Kalibr missile. He argued that Russia\u2019s long term strategic focus was on the Arctic High North, with its more immediate focus on the Eastern Med and Black Sea (BS). Repeatedly emphasised was the importance of the Russian Navy in meeting this strategy using all attributes of maritime power and the continued desire to pursue warm water port basing options.<\/p>\n

       <\/p>\n

      Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n

      The conference succeeded in bringing together a wide spectrum of military, MoD civil servants and academics to discuss a resurgent Russia and its implications for the Naval Service.\u00a0 The positive responses and networking opportunities presented by the conference indicate a heightened awareness but represents just one more opportunity to raise the profile of its implications.<\/p>\n

       <\/p>\n

       <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

        Introduction On Tue 13 Jun 17 the Fleet Battle Staffs (FBS) and the Dartmouth Centre for Seapower and Strategy (DCSS) delivered a conference entitled \u2018Resurgent Russia\u2019 at HMS EXCELLENT.\u00a0 Attended by up to 120 people across academia and the military, the conference\u2019s ambition was to highlight Russia\u2019s resurgent role as a \u2018global power\u2019 with… Continue reading FLEET BATTLE STAFFS AND DARTMOUTH CENTRE FOR SEAPOWER AND STRATEGY \u2018RESURGENT RUSSIA\u2019 CONFERENCE NOTE<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":2364,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[137],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2363","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-events","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2363","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2363"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2363\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2366,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2363\/revisions\/2366"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2364"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2363"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2363"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2363"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}