{"id":3426,"date":"2018-04-28T21:07:08","date_gmt":"2018-04-28T21:07:08","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/?p=3426"},"modified":"2018-04-28T21:09:42","modified_gmt":"2018-04-28T21:09:42","slug":"chinas-defence-budget-what-everyone-is-missing","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/2018\/04\/28\/chinas-defence-budget-what-everyone-is-missing\/","title":{"rendered":"CHINA\u2019S DEFENCE BUDGET: WHAT EVERYONE IS MISSING"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2015\/10\/CV16-Liaoning.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-large wp-image-406\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2015\/10\/CV16-Liaoning-1024x683.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"560\" height=\"374\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2015\/10\/CV16-Liaoning-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2015\/10\/CV16-Liaoning-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2015\/10\/CV16-Liaoning-560x373.jpg 560w, https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2015\/10\/CV16-Liaoning-260x173.jpg 260w, https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/50\/2015\/10\/CV16-Liaoning-160x107.jpg 160w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 560px) 100vw, 560px\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Source: The National Interest<\/p>\n<p>By Nan Li<\/p>\n<p>The recent session of China\u2019s National People\u2019s Congress approved an increase of China\u2019s defense budget by 8.1 percent, which translates into an annual spending of $175 billion for the People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) for 2018.<\/p>\n<p>Chinese analysts state that the increase keeps pace with China\u2019s annual economic growth rate of 6.9 percent for 2017, and that unlike before 2016 when defense budget had gained mostly double-digit growth since the early 1990s, it has slowed down to single-digit growth for the past three consecutive years.<\/p>\n<p>They also point out that China\u2019s defense budget as a percentage of growth domestic product (GDP) and of total government spending and in terms of per capita spending on defense remains low compared with other major powers. China\u2019s 2018 defense budget, for instance, constitutes only about 1.4 percent of its annual GDP if compared with the United States\u2019 3.4 percent and Russia\u2019s 2.8 percent.<\/p>\n<p>China\u2019s budget is also only one quarter of the United States\u2019 budget. As a result, they argue that this year\u2019s budget increase would benefit China\u2019s military modernization moderately. When such an argument is reasonable, there are several other reasons that suggest that the budget increase may be more significant than it appears to be.<\/p>\n<p>Read more at: http:\/\/nationalinterest.org\/feature\/chinas-defense-budget-what-everyone-missing-25540<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Source: The National Interest By Nan Li The recent session of China\u2019s National People\u2019s Congress approved an increase of China\u2019s defense budget by 8.1 percent, which translates into an annual spending of $175 billion for the People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) for 2018. Chinese analysts state that the increase keeps pace with China\u2019s annual economic growth&hellip; <a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/2018\/04\/28\/chinas-defence-budget-what-everyone-is-missing\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">CHINA\u2019S DEFENCE BUDGET: WHAT EVERYONE IS MISSING<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":406,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[80],"class_list":["post-3426","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-security-and-strategy","tag-china","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3426","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3426"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3426\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3428,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3426\/revisions\/3428"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/406"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3426"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3426"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.plymouth.ac.uk\/dcss\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3426"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}