Sourced: Defence One
By Elisabeth Braw
A mysterious incident occurs. It can’t be conclusively attributed, but the targeted country pins the attack with near-certainty on another country — which unleashes a disinformation campaign, ridiculing the target and proposing a range of other explanations. The UK in 2018? Yes – and Sweden, for far longer.
Over the past several decades of hunting submarines in its waters, Stockholm has dealt with similar combinations of mysterious-incident-plus-disinformation-campaign. Other Western nations would do well to learn from the Swedes’ experience.
On Oct. 16, 2014, news broke that Sweden’s signals intelligence agency, the National Defence Radio Establishment, had intercepted traffic on a Russian emergency channel. The following day, a resident of the Stockholm archipelago contacted the Swedish Armed Forces, saying he had seen what looked like a submarine.
The armed forces immediately dispatched its sub-hunting flotilla and several other vessels. Later that evening, the signals intelligence agency intercepted encrypted Russian radio traffic, tracing its source to an area within the archipelago.
Read more at: http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/04/how-deal-russian-information-warfare-ask-sweden/147154/